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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Nine studies find that people believe their money has greater purchasing power than the 
same quantity of others’ money. Using a variety of products from socks to clocks to chocolates, 
we found that participants thought the same amount of money could buy more when it belonged 
to themselves versus others – a pattern that extended to undesirable products. Participants also 
believed their money – in the form of donations, taxes, fines, and fees – would help 
charities/governments more than others’ money. We tested six mechanisms based on 
psychological distance, the endowment effect, wishful thinking, better-than-average biases, pain-
of-payment, and beliefs about product preferences. Only a psychological distance mechanism 
received support. Specifically, we found that the perceived purchasing power of other people’s 
money decreased logarithmically as others’ psychological distance from the self increased, 
consistent with psychological distance’s subadditive property. Further supporting a 
psychological distance mechanism, we found that framing one’s own money as distant (vs. near) 
reduced the self-other difference in perceived purchasing power. Our results suggest that beliefs 
about the value of money depend on who owns it, and we discuss implications for marketing, 
management, psychology, and economics.  
 
Keywords: money; self-other differences; psychological distance; social distance; subjective 
value; endowment effect 
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Purchasing power is money’s most fundamental property. Money has value because it 
can be exchanged for goods and services, and its degree of value depends on the quantity and 
quality of goods and services it can buy. Consumers consider money’s purchasing power 
whenever they decide how much money to save, budget, or withdraw for purchases. The present 
research examines whether perceptions of money’s purchasing power depend on whom the 
money belongs to. Specifically, we claim that people think a fixed quantity of their own money 
buys more than the same amount of others’ money. Thus, we suggest, people perceive money as 
having greater market value when it belongs to themselves than when it belongs to others. As we 
subsequently explain, the psychological distance between the self and others plays a key role in 
this effect. 
Research and theory in marketing, economics, and psychology has long been concerned 
with how people think about money (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1984). One stream of this 
work has identified biases in how people track and evaluate their financial activities (i.e., mental 
accounting; Thaler 1985, 2005). For example, consumers spend money in a way that “matches” 
its source: Money that is fortuitously found in an old coat pocket is spent indulgently, whereas 
money that comes from an old savings account is spent carefully (O’Curry 1997; Tykocinski and 
Pittman 2013). Similarly, windfalls that are linked to negatively perceived sources (such as 
gambling) tend to be spent in more virtuous ways – as if people emotionally launder their money 
to make it clean (Levav and McGraw 2009). The appearance of money has also been shown to 
affect how people spend and manage it. For example, people are more likely to cheat with used, 
dirty bills than with clean, crisp bills (Yang et al. 2013). Likewise, because people value dirty 
bills less than clean bills, they are quicker to spend dirty bills but place greater value on products 
purchased with clean ones (Di Muro and Noseworthy 2013; Galoni and Noseworthy 2015). 
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Similarly, research has shown that consumers undervalue (vs. overvalue) products when they are 
priced in a foreign currency that is a fraction (vs. multiple) of a consumer’s home currency 
(Raghubir and Srivastava 2002) – an effect that has consequences for how much consumers 
decide to spend (Raghubir, Morwitz, and Santana 2012). Consistent with this literature, people 
also prefer larger denominations of money as opposed to an equal sum of smaller bills (Mishra, 
Mishra, and Nayakankuppam 2006; Raghubir and Srivastava 2009). Together, these findings 
reveal that people treat money differently depending on financially irrelevant factors such as its 
“looks” or its source. We examine whether perceptions of money’s value depend on whether that 
source is the self or someone else. 
While prior work has not considered self-other differences in the perceived value of 
money, it does suggest that people treat money differently when it belongs to others versus the 
self. For example, decision makers are less loss averse and more risk seeking when making 
choices with other people’s money than with their own (Andersson, Holm, Tyran, and 
Wengström 2015; Chakravarty, Harrison, Haruvy, and Rutström 2011; Mengarelli et al. 2014; 
Pahlke, Strasser, and Vieider 2012; Polman 2012). One explanation is that people simply care 
less about the consequences of choices they make for others versus themselves, but research 
suggests that if anything, people are more motivated to make good choices for others than for 
themselves (Polman and Emich 2011; Polman and Vohs 2016). Another explanation is that 
people perceive the same amount of money as smaller when it belongs to others versus to 
themselves. For example, related research on time suggests that people perceive a fixed duration 
(e.g., 2 years) as shorter for others than for themselves (Maglio, Trope, and Liberman 2013a). 
Importantly, people tend to treat time and money similarly (DeVoe and Pfeffer 2007; Rajagopal 
and Rha 2009), at least in some contexts (Gino and Mogilner 2013; Leclerc, Schmitt, and Dube 
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1995; Okada and Hoch 2004). Thus, if people perceive their own time as longer than others’ 
time, then it is possible that they also perceive their own money as larger than others’ money.  
Our research builds on previous work by Stellar and Willer (2014), who found that 
people perceive money’s value differently depending on how the money was earned. Like us, 
they operationalize the perceived value of money as its perceived purchasing power. This is not 
unlike how inflation is measured: by calculating the cost of household goods. In their study, 
participants entered a raffle to win a $50 prize that ostensibly had been earned in either an 
immoral or neutral fashion by one of two well-known businesses. In the “neutral money” 
condition, participants were told the raffle money was provided by Target. In the “immoral 
money” condition, they were told that the raffle money was from Walmart and likely earned with 
substandard labor practices. Then they saw a list of common household items and estimated how 
many of each they could buy if they won the $50. Participants in the immoral condition thought 
they could purchase fewer items than participants in the neutral condition. Their study 
demonstrates that perceptions of money’s value depend on a situational factor that is logically 
unrelated to how much money can actually buy (see also Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky 2012; 
Jonas, Greitemeyer, Frey, and Schulz-Hardt 2002; Lasaleta, Sedikides, and Vohs 2014; 
Wertenbroch, Soman, and Chattopadhyay 2007). Going beyond this past work, we examine 
whether perceptions of money’s value depend on to whom the money belongs.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 Why would money owned by others feel subjectively less valuable than money owned by 
the self? In overview, our argument draws on two key points: (a) others’ money is more 
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psychologically distant than one’s own money, and (b) the same objective quantity of something 
(e.g., 5 hours; 50 miles; $100) can seem like a smaller amount when it is psychologically distant 
versus psychologically close. Thus, $100 should seem like “less money” – able to purchase 
fewer goods and services – when it belongs to someone else than when it belongs to the self. As 
we explain, our arguments are not only grounded in previous theorizing about psychological 
distance, but also advance that theorizing in important ways. 
 To begin, we propose that others’ money feels more psychologically distant than one’s 
own money. Research on the concept of psychological distance refers to it as “a subjective 
experience that something is close or far away from the self, here, and now” (Trope and 
Liberman 2010, p. 440). Just as across the country feels more distant than next door, and next 
year feels more distant than tomorrow, others can feel more or less distant to the self. 
Psychological distance encompasses temporal, spatial, probabilistic, and social distance 
(Liberman and Trope 2014). Applied to the present research, money could be psychologically 
close or distant on any of these four dimensions: temporal (e.g., it could be spent now versus in 
the future), spatial (e.g., it could be held in a bank account here versus thousands of miles away), 
hypothetical (e.g., it could be the prize in a lottery with a one-in-ten versus one-in-ten-thousand 
chance of winning), or social (e.g., it could belong to the self or another person). Our work 
focuses on social distance. Because others are, by definition, more socially distant than the self, 
it stands to reason that others’ money also feels more distant than one’s own money. Moreover, 
the more socially distant a person is, the more psychologically distant his or her money should 
feel. Indeed, money belonging to close others (e.g., friends and family) feels more like one’s own 
money than money belonging to distant others (e.g., acquaintances; Aron et al. 1991; Tu, Shaw, 
and Fishbach 2016).  
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The difference in psychological distance between one’s own and others’ money is 
relevant to our research because a fixed quantity feels subjectively smaller when evaluated at 
greater psychological distance (Kanten 2011; Maglio and Trope 2011). For example, 3 months 
seems shorter if it starts in 12 months (high distance) than if it starts now (low distance; 
Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, and Bettman 2009). This example reflects the Weber-Fechner Law 
(Dehaene 2003), and illustrates a subadditivity property – a diminishing sensitivity to increases 
in psychological distance (Kim, Zhang, and Li 2008). In plain terms, subadditivity reflects a 
contrast effect, in which a fixed quantity (e.g., 3 months) will seem psychologically smaller 
when it is evaluated against a large quantity (e.g., 12 months) versus a small quantity (e.g., 0 
months). Note, by “smaller” we do not mean that money’s size is literally smaller; rather, we 
mean that a dollar (or a euro or a yen) can feel like less money – as though it buys less, akin to 
having less purchasing power. Originally, the Weber-Fechner Law was proposed to explain how 
people perceive changes in physical stimuli. For example, a candle seems like less light when 
added to a bright room than when added to a dark room. However, the Weber-Fechner Law also 
applies to judgments of quantity more generally (Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, and Cohen 
1998), including quantities of psychological distance (see Maglio et al. 2013a). 
The marketing literature has demonstrated a variety of subadditive effects, including: in 
judgments of price discounts, where the difference between a 30% and a 50% discount feels 
smaller than the difference between a 10% and a 30% discount (Della Bitta and Monroe 1980); 
in judgments of calories, where an unhealthy meal that is combined with a healthy item is 
perceived to contain fewer calories than when the unhealthy meal is perceived alone (Chernev 
2011); and in judgments of money’s value, where a discount of $5 seems less valuable when the 
original price is $125 than when it is $15 (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). In mathematical terms, 
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subadditivity describes a logarithmic function. At low levels of a quantity, the relation between 
one unit change in quantity is linear, but for increasingly higher levels, the relation gradually 
flattens, illustrating a pattern of scope neglect. For example, each $5 increase to a pot of money 
has a diminishing marginal effect on the pot’s subjective value. As the pot grows, each additional 
$5 seems smaller.  
These examples above illustrate subadditivity on a single dimension of measurement –
 i.e., within-dimensional subadditivity, whereby a larger amount of time, space, or money, 
respectively shrinks an additional hour, mile, or dollar. However, subadditivity applies across the 
four dimensions of psychological distance as well (Maglio, Trope, and Liberman 2013b). As an 
example of this cross-dimensional subadditivity, people thought that the two years to an election 
felt like a longer time when the election was described as occurring nearby (at their university) 
versus faraway (at another university; Maglio et al. 2013a). Similarly, 27 miles felt like a greater 
distance when people were told they would begin traveling it in 7 days versus 365 days (Maglio 
et al. 2013a). Currently, it is unclear what causes cross-dimensional subadditivity (Maglio et al. 
2013b), but researchers do agree it hinges upon the idea that the different dimensions of 
psychological distance each have the same effect on construal level (Bar Anan, Liberman, Trope, 
and Algom 2007; Fiedler, Jung, Wänke, and Alexopoulos 2012; Maglio et al. 2013b). It is well 
established that the more psychologically distant a stimulus is, the more abstractly it is construed 
(Trope and Liberman 2010); and insofar as two dimensions share the same effect on construal 
level, “they share a common meaning and are seen as fitting together” (Wakslak 2012, p. 151). 
Indeed, past research has found cross-dimensional subadditivity among the four dimensions of 
psychological distance (Maglio et al. 2013a). In this vein, our research asks a different question: 
 10 
whether one dimension of psychological distance (i.e., social distance) can subadditively affect 
perceptions of a non-distance dimension (i.e., the purchasing power of money). 
Previous research would suggest money would not seem less valuable when owned by 
others (Maglio et al. 2013a, 2013b). In this view, one dimension of psychological distance can 
shrink another dimension of psychological distance, but cannot shrink perceptions of a non-
distance quantity, like money. In the only study to test this view (Maglio et al. 2013a, study 1B), 
participants judged a $150,000 budget as feeling equivalently large when it was framed as 
belonging to an organization composed of their own university’s faculty (socially close) versus 
another university’s faculty (socially distant). However, because the study only had sufficient 
statistical power to detect a large effect size (i.e., 80% power to detect d > 0.84 at p < .05), it 
could have missed a real effect.  
Contrary to this previous theory and research, we propose that psychological distance can 
have a subadditive effect on perceptions of money’s purchasing power, because money has a 
likewise similar effect on construal level as the dimensions of psychological distance. That is, the 
larger an amount of money is, the more abstractly it is construed (MacDonnell and White 2015; 
see also Hansen, Kutzner, and Wänke 2013). Because construal level is a “common currency” 
that allows one dimension of psychological distance to subadditively affect a separate dimension 
of psychological distance (Bar Anan et al. 2007; Fiedler et al. 2012), it stands to reason that 
cross-dimensional subadditivity might extend to any two dimensions that share a similar effect 
on construal. In this vein, money is a candidate non-distance dimension for cross-dimensional 
subadditivity, because it too influences construal level in the same manner as the other 
dimensions of distance. Thus, the more psychologically distant the money, the more diminished 
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(and thus less valuable) it would seem. In other words, much like temporal distance (e.g., days) 
can shrink spatial distance (e.g., miles), social distance may seem to shrink money. 
 To summarize our argument, money is more socially, and thus psychologically, distant 
when it belongs to others than to the self, and research has shown that (a) the different 
dimensions of psychological distance have subadditive effects on each other; (b) this cross-
dimensional subadditivity effect rests on the different distance dimensions’ common effect on 
construal level; and (c) money has a similar effect on construal level as psychological distance. 
We thus predicted that psychological distance can have a subadditive effect on money, such that 
the same number of dollars that is owned by another person (vs. the self) will seem like a smaller 
amount of money. 
Our theorizing suggests that psychological distance should diminish perceptions of a 
variety of different quantities, not just money, as long as those quantities and psychological 
distance have similar effects on construal level (for a review of variables that affect construal 
level, see Fujita, Trope, and Liberman 2016). However, as a first test of our theory, our research 
focused on money for several reasons. First, people make frequent judgments about money’s 
purchasing power: when they decide how much to withdraw from a cash machine, how much to 
convert to foreign currency for a trip abroad, or how much to save each month for retirement. 
Thus, our focus on money allows us to demonstrate the far-reaching implications of our 
phenomenon. Second, interest in money spans centuries and academic disciplines (e.g., 
marketing, economics, management, accounting, finance, psychology, anthropology, etc.). Thus, 
a focus on money allows our work to relate to a wide range of different areas of research. Third, 
judgments of money represent a particularly stringent test of our theorizing. Because people use 
money all the time, they should be familiar with its properties. It is obviously not the case that 
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one’s own $50 can actually be exchanged for more products than another person’s $50. By 
contrast, other quantities, like customer loyalty points, may be less familiar to participants, and 
have unique, less generalizable properties (e.g., loyalty points belonging to “preferred” 
customers might actually be exchangeable for more goods and services than points belonging to 
ordinary customers). Thus, showing our effect with money highlights its robustness and non-
intuitive nature. 
What is more, besides that an investigation of money is theoretically and empirically 
interesting in its own right, our studies provide the first evidence linking psychological distance 
to the perceived purchasing power of money. And, our work is the first to show that 
psychological distance can have a subadditive effect on perceptions of a non-distance quantity – 
that is, social distance can make a fixed quantity of dollars seem smaller. As noted, previous 
research and theory on psychological distance argue that such an effect does not and could not 
occur (Maglio et al. 2013a). Thus, in addition to demonstrating a novel and surprising 
phenomenon about how people think about the value of money, we challenge an existing 
theory’s presumed boundary conditions. 
Encouragingly, our prediction is consistent with a large body of work on intertemporal 
discounting, which examines how people prefer less money now over more money later, to a 
seemingly irrational extent (see Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002; Soman et al. 
2005). For example, participants in one study wanted $15 in the present as much as $30 in three 
months (Thaler 1981). Although studies of intertemporal discounting do not share our focus on 
perceptions of purchasing power, they do suggest that a fixed sum seems like “less money” in 
the future compared to the present. Given that time is psychologically interchangeable with other 
dimensions of psychological distance (Trope and Liberman 2010), it is plausible that people 
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would also perceive socially distant money as a smaller amount. Thus, $50 could seem like less 
money – capable of purchasing fewer goods – when it belongs to others than when it belongs to 
the self.  
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
 
We conducted nine studies to test whether people believe their money can buy more than 
the same amount of others’ money. In addition to testing the role of psychological distance in 
this effect, we examined several alternative mechanisms related to the endowment effect, wishful 
thinking, better-than-average bias, pain of payment, and the expensiveness of products people 
assume they versus others prefer to purchase.  
Study 1A established the basic effect by showing that people believed their own $50 
could purchase more products than others’ $50. Study 1B replicated this effect when participants 
had a financial incentive to accurately estimate how many products $50 could purchase.  
Studies 2 and 3 found support for a psychological distance mechanism. Study 2 
manipulated the relative social distance of others from the self (with six different distances, in 
addition to a zero distance describing the self). The more distant the other person, the less 
purchasing power the money was assumed to have. Moreover, as social distance increased, it had 
a diminishing effect on assumed purchasing power, such that the perceived purchasing power of 
others’ money decreased linearly at first and then flattened. In other words, there was an 
indistinguishable difference between perceptions of distant (far) others’ money and more distant 
(farther) others’ money – a logarithmic function consistent with psychological distance’s 
subadditive property.  
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Study 3 again manipulated whether people judged the purchasing power of their own 
versus others’ money, and orthogonally manipulated another dimension of psychological 
distance (i.e., whether the money was framed as more versus less hypothetical). According to 
subadditivity, one dimension of psychological distance will have a smaller effect on judgment 
when instantiated at a high (vs. low) level of a different psychological distance dimension 
(Maglio et al. 2013b). Thus, if the psychological distance between the self and others drives our 
effect, then this effect should be smaller when psychological distance is already high (vs. low). 
Supporting this prediction, people tended to think their own money could buy more than others’ 
money when psychological distance was low, but not high. As we explain subsequently, the 
results also cast doubt on an alternative explanation based on the endowment effect (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). 
The remaining studies (4-8, reported in the online appendix) replicated our basic effect in 
a range of different domains (e.g., charitable donations), while addressing alternative 
mechanisms. Studies 4 and 5 tested different versions of a “wishful thinking” mechanism, 
finding no support. Studies 6 and 7 tested a related mechanism that relies on the “better-than-
average” effect, and found no support. Finally, study 8 found no evidence that beliefs about the 
purchasing power of one’s own versus others’ money were driven by beliefs about how painful it 
is for them to spend money, or differences in the costliness of products that people imagine they 
versus others would purchase. In sum, our nine studies demonstrate a novel, robust, and 
replicable phenomenon, support a mechanism based on psychological distance, and cast doubt on 
alternative explanations. 
 
STUDIES 1A AND 1B: ESTABLISHING THE EFFECT 
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Studies 1A and 1B test whether people think that a fixed sum of money can purchase 
more products when it belongs to the self than when it belongs to others. The two studies 
followed similar procedures, except that in study 1B participants had a financial incentive to 
accurately estimate how much money can buy. 
 
Method 
 
We recruited 350 participants in study 1A from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), 
choosing this sample size before collecting data (Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn 2013) 
because it provides sufficiently high statistical power to detect a small effect (both before 
excluding data and after the exclusions described next). After removing those who failed an 
attention check or did not complete the study, 289 participants remained (for the attention check, 
participants indicated whether they were thinking of their own money or someone else’s money).  
To assess generalizability to a different population, study 1B recruited participants in 
public locations in a mid-sized American city. We aimed for 200 and succeeded in recruiting 
194. The targeted sample size was smaller than in study 1A due to the comparative difficulty of 
recruiting participants in public versus on MTurk. Despite the smaller sample size, it is 
noteworthy that a post hoc power analysis found that we had adequate statistical power at α = 
.05. As there was no attention check, we retained all data for analysis. 
In both studies, we employed a between-subjects design in which participants saw a list 
of consumer products. Depending on their randomly assigned condition, they were either asked, 
“How many of each item do you think you can buy with $50?” or “How many of each item do 
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you think someone other than yourself can buy with $50?” To create an incentive-compatible 
judgment context, study 1B participants estimated the number of items knowing that anyone who 
estimated correctly (based on the manufacturer-suggested retail prices) would be entered in a 
raffle for a $100 Amazon gift card. 
In study 1A, the products were: dozen eggs, Hershey chocolate bar, toothbrush, pair of 
scissors, soft wool socks, Big Mac, frozen pizza, small latte, light bulb, and loaf of bread. In 
study 1B, the products were: 6-count Bounty paper towel rolls, packages of 8-count Energizer 
AA batteries, packages of 2-count Sharpie fine point markers, 2-liter bottles of Coca-Cola, boxes 
of 90-count Glad kitchen-sized trash bags, packages of 6-count Scotch Brite sponges, Brita 
water pitchers, DiGiorno frozen pizzas, 1-liter bottles of Listerine, and boxes of 500-count Q-Tip 
cotton swabs. 
 
Results and Discussion 
  
Because some products on our lists were more expensive than others (and therefore fewer 
of these products can be bought with $50), we z-transformed responses to each product 
(separately in each study) before averaging the responses. In other words, our dependent measure 
is the (standardized) mean number of products participants believed they or others could buy 
with $50. For the raw, unstandardized results and corresponding tests for each individual item, 
see table 1. A higher number of products is indicative of higher purchasing power and hence 
value of money.  
Supporting our hypothesis, study 1A participants estimated that their own money could 
buy more everyday products (M = 0.078, SD = 0.71) than others’ money could (M = -0.087, SD 
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= 0.64), t(287) = 2.07, p = .04, d = 0.25. We found the same result when participants had a 
financial incentive to correctly estimate the number of products: study 1B participants also 
thought their own money could buy more products (M = 0.106, SD = 0.66) than others’ money 
could (M = -0.103, SD = 0.42), t(192) = 2.64, p = .009, d = 0.38. In fact, despite the financial 
incentive, study 1B’s effect size was somewhat larger than study 1A’s. These results provide 
preliminary evidence that people think the same amount of their own money has greater 
purchasing power than others’ money, thus acting as if the market value of money is higher 
when the money belongs to them versus others.  
 
STUDY 2: EXAMINING MULTIPLE DEGREES OF SOCIAL DISTANCE 
 
Study 2 tested two predictions. First, we have argued that people impute greater value to 
their own money than to others’ money because others are more socially distant than the self. If 
this is true, then the subjective value of money should decrease as one considers increasingly 
socially distant others. Second, in order for this relation between social distance and perceived 
purchasing power to be subadditive, it should display a logarithmic pattern (Jones and Rachlin 
2006; Kim et al. 2008; Zauberman et al. 2009): The effect of increasing social distance should be 
relatively linear at low levels of social distance (e.g., 1
st
-tier friend to 2
nd
-tier friend), tapering off 
at higher levels (e.g., 9
th
-tier to 10
th
-tier friend). To test these predictions, study 2 asked 
participants to consider the purchasing power of money belonging to the self or others with 
varying levels of closeness to the self. 
  
Method 
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Participants in study 2 were randomly assigned to one of seven conditions in a between-
subjects design. Because of the number of conditions, we recruited 950 participants on MTurk, 
of whom 939 completed the study. In the self condition, they judged the purchasing power of 
their own money. In the six other-person conditions, they read the following passage (adapted 
from Jones and Rachlin 2006): 
 
The following question asks you to imagine that you have made a list of the 100 
people closest to you in the world ranging from your dearest friend or relative at 
position #1 to a mere acquaintance at #100. The person at number one would be 
someone you know well and is your closest friend or relative. The person at #100 
might be someone you recognize and encounter but perhaps you may not even 
know their name. You do not have to physically create the list – just imagine that 
you have done so. 
 
Depending on condition, participants in the six other-person conditions judged the 
purchasing power of money belonging to either the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 5
th
, 10
th
, 20
th
, or 50
th
-ranked person 
on their list. Our independent variable was thus rank-ordered social distance, with participants in 
the self condition assigned a rank of 0. To increase generalizability, we used a different measure 
of purchasing power than in studies 1A and 1B: Participants provided subjective judgments of 
how much they thought the relevant individual could purchase with $900 (1 = not a lot to 9 = a 
lot) rather than estimating the number of products that a sum of money could purchase. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Because our independent variable (social distance) is ordinal, we conducted a non-
parametric test of its relationship with purchasing power. As predicted, the more socially distant 
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the money’s owner was, the less participants thought the money could buy, Spearman’s ρ (937) 
= -.10, p = .003. The negative relationship between social distance and purchasing power was 
also significant when we analyzed only the participants in the six other-person conditions, ρ 
(805) = -.07, p = .035. That is, again, the more socially distant another person was, the less 
participants thought his or her money could purchase. The effect sizes were small, probably 
because asking participants whether they could buy “a lot” of products is a less precise measure 
than asking them to estimate the specific number of products they could buy (as in our previous 
studies). More importantly, these findings lend support to our claim that social distance plays a 
role in diminishing the subjective value of money when considering the self versus others. In 
support, we did not find a difference between participants’ perceived purchasing power of their 
own money (M = 7.72, SD = 2.51) and money that belongs to the first person on their list (M = 
7.60, SD = 2.36), t(266) = 0.417, p = .677. Thus, social distance alone is sufficient to reduce 
estimates of purchasing power.  
We next tested whether the shape of the relationship between social distance and 
perceived purchasing power was logarithmic. Recall that people show diminishing marginal 
sensitivity to increasing social distance (i.e., the subadditivity principle; Kim et al. 2008; Maglio 
et al. 2013a, 2013b). Applied to our paradigm, subadditivity suggests that the effect of social 
distance on perceived purchasing power should taper off as social distance increases – a 
logarithmic effect. To test this logarithmic effect, we plotted the data in figure 1 and carried out a 
curve estimation analysis with closeness as the independent variable and perceived value of 
money as the dependent variable. Compared with a linear, quadratic, or cubic curve, only the 
logarithmic curve passed the threshold of significance, b = -0.073, t(938) = 2.25, p = 0.025, 
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indicating that the effect of social distance on purchasing power gets subadditively smaller as 
social distance increases.  
Together, study 2’s findings are consistent with our claim that social distance plays a role 
in why people impute greater purchasing power to their own money than to others’ money. 
Perceived purchasing power decreased with increased social distance – and the effect of social 
distance on purchasing power diminished as participants considered more distant others, 
consistent with the subadditive property of psychological distance. 
 
STUDY 3: ADDING DISTANCE TO ONE’S OWN MONEY 
 
 We have argued that the subadditive property of psychological distance explains why 
people think their money can buy more than others’ money. Study 2 provided initial evidence by 
asking participants to consider others with varying degrees of social distance. Study 3 provided a 
complementary test in a moderation-of-process design (Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 2005). 
According to subadditivity, a given change in psychological distance will seem smaller 
when judging targets who are already psychologically distant (Maglio et al. 2013a; Zauberman et 
al. 2009). For example, a social distance manipulation had a smaller effect on product 
evaluations when participants considered buying the products in one year (high temporal 
distance) versus the next day (low temporal distance; Kim et al. 2008). We thus reasoned that the 
psychological distance between one’s own and others’ money would seem smaller when people 
are already thinking about their own money as psychologically distant (versus near). 
Accordingly, if people think their own money has greater market value than others’ money 
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because of psychological distance, then making one’s own money feel more psychologically 
distant should attenuate the effect. 
  Study 3 thus manipulated social distance and another dimension of psychological 
distance in a 2 × 2 factorial design. Specifically, we manipulated whether people judged their 
own versus others’ prize money, and orthogonally manipulated whether winning that money was 
more or less uncertain. We predicted that the difference in judgments of one’s own versus others’ 
money would be diminished when measured in terms of high uncertainty (i.e., high hypothetical 
distance) versus low uncertainty (i.e., low hypothetical distance) – a moderation effect. This test 
would support the role of psychological distance in our effect. 
We manipulated hypothetical distance in lieu of temporal or spatial distance because, for 
reasons unrelated to psychological distance, actual purchasing power varies from time to time, 
and place to place. For example, at a McDonalds in the US, a Big Mac cost 12% more in 2013 
than in 2008 (temporal distance), and, in 2008, a Big Mac cost 28% more in the UK than in the 
US (spatial distance; The Economist 2017). In the context of money, hypotheticality is thus a 
cleaner manipulation of psychological distance than time or space. 
The hypotheticality manipulation also tests an alternative explanation based on the 
endowment effect (Kahneman et al. 1990). In endowment studies, sellers receive an item (e.g., a 
mug) that buyers can purchase. Suggesting that ownership increases how much people value an 
item, the average seller asks for more money in exchange for the item than the average buyer is 
willing to offer (i.e., sellers’ willingness to accept [WTA] is higher than buyer’s willingness to 
pay [WTP]; see Morewedge and Giblin 2015). Our paradigm differs in key ways – for example, 
endowment studies examine the monetary value people attach to items, whereas we examine 
how people judge money itself; which is to say that endowment studies are concerned with the 
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personal value people attach to an item (e.g., as measured by their WTA or WTP), whereas we 
have examined perceptions of money’s market value (i.e., purchasing power – how many items 
money can buy). These differences aside, it is possible that a mechanism similar to the 
endowment effect explains our findings: Merely owning money may increase its perceived 
market value (cf. Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, and Wilson 2009).  
To be sure, an endowment explanation would struggle to account for study 2’s results, 
which showed that people imputed more purchasing power to socially closer (vs. more distant) 
others. The endowment effect indeed predicts that people value their own possessions more than 
others’, but – unlike our psychological distance account – it makes no predictions about how 
people value possessions belonging to different others who vary in their level of distance to the 
self (as we find). 
Nonetheless, study 3 pitted endowment and distance against each other in a more direct 
test. Specifically, in study 3’s 2 (ownership: self vs. other) × 2 (hypothetical distance: close vs. 
far) design, an endowment mechanism would predict a main effect of ownership – that people 
impute greater purchasing power to their own money than to others’ money, regardless of 
hypothetical distance. By contrast, endowment would not clearly predict the interaction effect we 
anticipate: that ownership has a larger effect at near (vs. far) psychological distances. As noted, 
we expect the tendency to impute greater purchasing power to one’s own versus others’ money is 
smaller when thinking about a more-uncertain prize (high hypothetical distance) than a less-
uncertain prize (low hypothetical distance). Psychological distance would provide a more 
parsimonious explanation than endowment for these results.  
 
Method 
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In advance of data collection, we planned to recruit 800 participants from MTurk. This 
represents more participants per condition than in our previous studies because study 3 tests an 
attenuated interaction, which requires larger cell sizes to detect than main effects (Simonsohn 
2014). The study had four conditions in a 2 × 2 between-subjects design: Participants judged 
either their own or others’ $50, and the money was described as the prize in a raffle that has a “5 
in 100 chance of winning” (high uncertainty, hence high hypothetical distance) or a “95 in 100 
chance of winning” (low uncertainty, hence low hypothetical distance). 
Similar to studies 1A and 1B, participants rated how many items they (or someone else) 
could buy with the $50; however in a departure from the open-ended responses participants 
furnished in studies 1A and 1B, in this study, we asked participants to rate how many of each 
item could be purchased on a scale ranging from 0-5, 6-10, 11-15, … 71-75 (the midpoint of 
each range was selected as participants’ response, consistent with Stellar and Willer 2014). In 
this study, we assessed 6 products: box of cereal, gallon of milk, magazine, one-subject 
notebook, package of pencils, Snickers bar. We created a composite score from participants’ 
responses for the 6 items (α = .81), which furnished our dependent measure, money’s perceived 
purchasing power (see table 1 for the descriptive statistics and corresponding tests for each 
individual item). 
 
Results  
 
We analyzed the data with a 2 (money’s ownership: self vs. other) × 2 (hypothetical 
distance: close vs. distant) factorial ANOVA. Replicating our previous studies, we observed a 
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significant main effect of ownership: Participants judged their own money as significantly more 
valuable than others’ money (respectively, Ms = 23.54 and 19.92; SDs = 9.26 and 10.54), F(1, 
796) = 27.29, p < .001, d = 0.36. Consistent with our argument that a sum of money seems 
smaller when it is more psychologically distant, a second main effect indicated that participants 
judged the more certain (psychologically close) money as marginally more valuable than the less 
certain (psychologically distant) money; respectively, Ms = 22.37 and 21.10, SDs = 10.73 and 
9.35, F(1, 796) = 3.49, p = .062, d = 0.13.  
Most importantly, supporting a psychological distance account of why people judge their 
own money as more valuable than others’, the interaction was also significant, F(1, 796) = 8.80, 
p = .003, d = 0.21 (ηp
2
 = .011). In the low uncertainty condition (low hypothetical distance), 
participants judged their own money as more valuable than others’ money (respectively, Ms = 
25.25 and 21.88; SDs = 9.55 and 8.67), F(1, 796) = 11.31, p < .001, d = 0.37. By contrast, in the 
high uncertainty condition (high hypothetical distance), participants’ judgments of their own 
versus others’ money were statistically indistinguishable (respectively, Ms = 20.31 and 19.54; 
SDs = 9.96 and 11.09), F(1, 796) = 0.63, p = .427. In sum, study 3, supports the role of 
psychological distance and its subadditive property in explaining the effect.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF STUDIES 1-3 
 
Why do people think their money can buy more than others’ money? Our results point to 
the subadditive property of psychological distance. That is, others’ money is more 
psychologically distant than one’s own, and more distant quantities can seem like smaller 
amounts. We found two forms of support. First, study 2 found that the more socially distant 
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another person was from the self, the less purchasing power participants imputed to his or her 
money. Additionally, the effect of social distance on perceived purchasing power was larger at 
closer distances than at farther distances to the self, consistent with psychological distance’s 
subadditive property (e.g., Kim et al. 2008). Second, study 3 established an important boundary 
condition that further supports the role of psychological distance: Making money feel more 
psychologically distant eliminated people’s tendency to impute greater value to their own money 
than to others’ money. This finding is again consistent with psychological distance’s subadditive 
property, in that the self-other difference in judgments of money was larger at low levels of 
psychological (hypothetical) distance, and disappeared at high levels of psychological 
(hypothetical) distance.  
Studies 2 and 3 provide evidence for the psychological mechanism using a moderation-
of-process approach (Spencer et al. 2005), in contrast to a measurement-of-mediation approach. 
Despite its widespread acceptance and continued use, the limitations of the measurement-of-
mediation approach for making causal arguments about psychological processes have been 
articulated repeatedly in recent years (see Bullock, Green, and Ha 2010; Green, Ha, and Bullock 
2010; Fiedler, Schott, and Meiser 2011; Jacoby and Sassenberg 2011; Spencer et al. 2005; Zhao, 
Lynch, and Chen 2010). In light of these limitations, we used the moderation-of-process 
approach, though we acknowledge it has its own limitations. For example, like the measurement-
of-mediation approach, it could leave open the possibility that an unmeasured causal variable 
explains study 2 and 3’s results. However, this possibility is unlikely because both studies used 
manipulations based on those that have been tested extensively in the psychological distance 
research over two decades. Also, any alternative explanation would have to be able to account 
for both the logarithmic pattern observed in study 2 and the compounded distance account 
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observed in study 3 – both of which are consistent with psychological distance and its property 
of subadditivity.  
 
SUMMARY OF STUDIES 4-8 
 
In addition to finding support for a psychological distance mechanism in studies 2 and 3 
(and ruling out an explanation based on the endowment effect), we tested four alternative 
explanations in studies 4-8 but found little support (see online appendix). In studies 4 and 5, we 
did not find evidence that wishful thinking leads people to think their money can buy more than 
others’ money. Specifically, study 4 participants thought that their $50 could buy more products 
than others’ $50, even though the products were not something that participants would wish to 
have (e.g., rotten eggs). And in study 5, we did not find that individual differences in wishful 
thinking moderated our effect. Studies 6 and 7 cast doubt on an explanation based on the better-
than-average effect (Alicke et al. 1995). In these studies, we tested whether people believe they 
can buy more than others for the same money because they think they are better-than-average at 
finding deals. We found that participants thought their money could help charitable and 
governmental organizations more than the same amount of other people’s money – contexts in 
which getting a deal was not relevant or possible. Finally, study 8’s results did not support the 
possibility that people imagine that they would choose less expensive versions of a product than 
others would. Moreover, study 8 also considered an explanation based on the possibility that 
people think money’s purchasing power is based on how painful it is to spend money. 
Demonstrating that this observation cannot account for our effect, we found no significant 
 27 
interaction between participants’ pain-of-payment and their beliefs about money’s purchasing 
power. 
 
META-ANALYSIS OF STUDIES 1-8 
 
All told, in our nine studies we observed the effect among 4475 participants, across 
several changes in procedure, design, and sample characteristics. Our evidence for the 
phenomenon emerged across a diversity of everyday products: durable and non-durable goods, 
hedonic and utilitarian goods, relative “virtues” and relative “vices,” desirable and undesirable, 
branded and un-branded, more-expensive and less-expense. In fact, we investigated 49 unique 
consumer products in all, and of the total product-items we tested, 45 of them were in the 
direction of our effect when analyzed individually (see table 1). Furthermore, besides the 49 
unique consumer products, our effect also emerged when people judged how helpful money 
could be when paid as donations to 5 different charities (study 6); as well how helpful money 
could be when paid as taxes, fines, or fees (study 7). That is, besides spending money on 
products, we also observed our effect in contexts in which consumers give their money in the 
form of payments to organizations such as charities and the government. Thus, in all, we 
investigated 57 unique items in total. It is rare in research to find this many different product- 
and item-stimuli tested in one paper; and the range and number of products and stimuli that 
comprise our studies increases the external validity of our findings. Although conducting field 
studies is one way to assess external validity, it can also be assessed by conducting studies 
containing many stimuli (Fontenelle, Phillips, and Lane 1985; Wells and Windschitl 1999). 
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Moreover, we tested our predictions in student and non-student subject populations, 
among different quantities of money (viz. $50, $100, $150, $300, $900), in both between- and 
within-subjects designs, and in an incentive-compatible context. And, we observed our effect 
regardless of whether participants provided an open-ended, numerical estimate of how many 
items they versus others could buy for a fixed sum; whether they provided a subjective response 
that could range from not a lot to a lot; or whether they provided their intuitions about how 
valuable the sum is. Overall, the meta-analytic effect size across our studies was small but 
consistent, average Cohen’s d = 0.267, p < .001. To put this effect size in perspective, it is useful 
to compare it to other effect sizes in the literature (Lakens, 2013). Our effect closely resembles 
the average effect size of research findings in the social influence literature (d = 0.262; Richard, 
Bond, and Stokes-Zoota 2003). Moreover, it is larger than the documented effects of some 
widely known and researched areas in marketing, such as the effect of comparative (vs. non-
comparative) advertising on purchase intentions (d = .200; Grewal, Kavanoor, Fern, Costley, and 
Barnes 1997). Finally, given that money’s market value does not actually depend on whether the 
money belongs to the self or others, and that the ability to buy goods and services is a defining 
property of money, an effect of this size is surprising and theoretically important (Prentice and 
Miller 1992). In sum, our results support a psychological distance mechanism and cast doubt on 
five alternative explanations.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Our research documents a novel and surprising phenomenon: People think their money 
has higher purchasing power than the same amount of another person’s money. We also 
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demonstrate that psychological distance plays a key role in this phenomenon. Decades of 
research have demonstrated how psychological distance influences consumer choices and 
judgments (Fujita et al. 2016), but we are the first to show how psychological distance can 
influence a fundamental perception on which these choices and judgments may rest: e.g., what 
choices consumers think they can make in exchange of their money. We also test and rule out 
other plausible theoretical explanations for our findings. Thus, our results speak to the literatures 
on psychological distance, endowment effect, wishful thinking, better-than-average biases, pain-
of-payment, and beliefs about product preferences. 
Our findings challenge an important assumption about psychological distance. Previous 
research and theory assumes that increasing one dimension of psychological distance (e.g., 
spatial distance) can only have subadditive (i.e., shrinking) effects on other dimensions of 
psychological distance (e.g., social distance; Maglio et al. 2013a, 2013b). For example, 200 
miles could seem like less time when traveled by someone else than when travelled by the self, 
but, according to this prior theorizing, $200 should not seem like less money when owned by 
someone else versus the self. A prior study that failed to find an effect of social distance on 
perceptions of money seemed to support this assumption (Maglio et al. 2013a, study 1B), but it 
had inadequate statistical power to detect an effect of the magnitude we observed in our meta-
analysis (i.e., only 15% power to detect d = 0.267 at p < .05). Thus, based on limited evidence, 
prior theorizing placed narrow limits on the ability of psychological distance to shrink 
perceptions of other quantities. Our results challenge these limits by demonstrating an effect that 
prior theorizing said did not and could not exist. We showed that increasing a dimension of 
psychological distance (i.e., social distance) had a subadditive effect on perceptions of money – a 
non-distance dimension. Having broken the presumed boundary conditions on psychological 
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distance’s subadditivity effect, our findings open the door to future research questions about 
what other quantities, besides money, perceptually “shrink” when their psychological distance is 
increased. We discuss such questions below.  
 
Implications for Psychological Distance and Subadditivity 
 
We have noted that perceptions of monetary value and psychological distance are 
connected by their shared effects on construal level (Liberman and Trope 2014; MacDonnell and 
White 2015). In line with research that has found that one dimension of distance subjectively 
shrinks the quantity of another dimension – a link that, as noted, is enabled by both dimensions 
sharing a similar effect on construal level (Maglio et al. 2013a) – we have found that social 
distance shrinks the quantity of money – a non-distance dimension that has a similar effect on 
construal level as distance. Thus, our main contribution is to demonstrate a novel phenomenon 
(that people believe their money has more purchasing power than others’) and to provide 
evidence of the mechanism (psychological distance). Taking this a step further, future work 
could explore, more generally speaking, why sharing a similar effect on construal level leads 
respective dimensions to show subadditive effects. This would inform not only our research 
focus on money, but also the research on the effects of experiencing multiple dimensions of 
distance (Bar Anan et al. 2007; Fiedler et al. 2012; Huang, Burtch, Hong, and Polman 2016; Kim 
et al. 2008; Maglio et al. 2013a, 2013b; Wakslak 2012; Williams and Bargh 2008; Yan 2014; 
Zhao and Xie 2011). Based on our findings, the subadditive effect of psychological distance will 
extend to other, non-monetary resources, provided these resources have a similar effect on 
construal. 
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In fact, considering the range of product-stimuli that have been found to relate to 
construal level (such as colors, sounds, shapes, smells, and measurement units; see Elder, 
Schlosser, Poor, and Xu 2017; Lee, Deng, Unnava, and Fujita 2014; Maglio, Rabaglia, Feder, 
Krehm, and Trope 2014; Maglio and Trope 2011), we expect that cross-dimensional 
subadditivity effects could apply to many non-distance dimensions that are instantiated at the 
same time. For example, when thinking about a heavier lawnmower, people might be less 
sensitive to its loudness, as though using a 50-lb lawnmower that produces 90 decibels of sound 
feels quieter than a 60-lb lawnmower that produces the same number of decibels. Or, when 
thinking about a camera with more megapixels, people might be less sensitive to its battery life, 
as though using a 20.2 megapixel camera with 8 hours of battery life feels like it will last longer 
than a 24.2 megapixel camera with the same number of hours of battery life. To be sure, research 
in marketing has investigated how consumers process and weigh the specifications that comprise 
their product choices (e.g., Hsee, Yang, Gu, and Chen 2011); however, no research has looked at 
how a smaller or larger quantity on one specification affects the perception of another 
specification’s quantity. 
We caution, however, that psychological distance may not have subadditive effects on 
perceptions of all stimuli that are related to construal level. Psychological distance and construal 
level are independent constructs (Van Boven and Caruso 2015), so although a higher construal 
level is usually associated with greater psychological distance, there are exceptions. For 
example, construal level and psychological distance have opposite effects on a stimuli’s 
emotional intensity (Williams, Stein, and Galguera 2014). When distance and construal do not go 
hand-in-hand, the type of cross-dimensional subadditive effect we have documented may not 
occur.  
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In keeping with the idea of emotional intensity, it is interesting to consider whether it 
alone could play a role in how people perceive the market value of their own and others’ money. 
We suspect that this role, if any, is not straightforward. In study 8, we found no evidence that the 
extent of pain-of-payment people experience (a measure of affect intensity) was related to the 
difference in perceived purchasing power of one’s own and others’ money. In other work, 
inducing feelings of nostalgia did not affect how people judged money’s purchasing power 
(Lasaleta et al. 2014). However, future work should examine whether different emotionally 
intense experiences shape the perceived purchasing power of money. Considering the range of 
myriad emotions, it is possible that some emotion(s), at varied intensities, would affect the 
subjective value of money.   
Throughout our studies, we have shown that a fixed quantity of money seems like a 
smaller amount – i.e., like “less money,” able to purchase fewer products – when it is 
psychologically distant from the self. It is interesting to consider whether money could seem 
physically smaller when thought about as psychologically distant – much like real objects appear 
physically smaller when viewed from faraway versus inspected up close. Perhaps so – when 
people perceive money as more valuable, they perceive the corresponding bills and coins as 
physically larger (Bruner and Goodman 1947; McCurdy 1956). Our theorizing does not depend 
on perceptions of money’s physical size, either literally or metaphorically, but this topic could 
merit future research. For example, perhaps in an intertemporal choice, researchers might find 
that later-larger money is seen as smaller than sooner-smaller money. 
 
Implications for the Endowment Effect 
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Our findings complement research on the endowment effect, by which people personally 
value products they own more than identical products they do not own (Kahneman et al. 1990; 
Morewedge and Giblin 2015). Related to the endowment effect, our findings show that people 
judge money to have higher market value than money that they do not own. However, our effect 
is not simply a novel demonstration of the endowment effect; there are several crucial 
differences that distinguish the two phenomena. 
First, the endowment effect is an effect of ownership; people place more value on what 
they versus others own (Morewedge et al. 2009). Thus, as noted, the endowment effect cannot 
account for why the more socially distant another person was, the fewer products people thought 
his or her money could buy – that is, in considering only others’ perceived purchasing power, the 
endowment effect cannot explain why people impute less purchasing power to increasingly 
distant others (study 2). Nor can the endowment effect explain why framing one’s own money in 
more hypothetically distant terms eliminated our effect, especially considering our manipulation 
of money’s hypothetical distance did not change the actual sum of money (study 3).  
Second, we examine a different type of value than endowment effect studies. The 
endowment effect is about how much people personally value a commodity (e.g., a mug), as 
measured by their willingness to trade it for other goods, or by the amount buyers are willing to 
pay (WTP) and sellers are willing to accept (WTA) (see Morewedge and Giblin 2015). The 
standard finding is that sellers value their own commodities more than buyers, as shown by a 
higher WTA than WTP. By contrast, we investigate how people judge the market value of a 
commodity, as measured by what they believe it can be exchanged for (in our case, the 
commodity is money). Our measure is analogous to asking how much money merchants would 
be willing to accept in exchange for their goods. Logically, the personal value a person places on 
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a commodity is different from his or her estimates of its market value. An individual could be 
unwilling to part with her grandmother’s costume jewelry (placing high personal value on it) and 
simultaneously believing that others would be unwilling to buy it (assigning low market value to 
it). Applied to money, the endowment effect would predict that people demand more goods in 
exchange for their money than others on average are willing to provide (i.e., higher WTA for 
money than WTP). Even if this prediction is true, it does not logically imply that they also 
believe that their money can buy more goods on the open market than others’ money can.  
Third, whereas studies of the endowment effect equate money with value, our studies 
question whether the subjective value of money is the same for buyers and sellers. Thus, our 
findings may provide an alternative explanation for the endowment effect. For example, WTP 
may be lower than WTA not because sellers want the relevant item more than buyers, but 
because sellers and buyers have different perceptions of money’s purchasing power. If buyers 
think their money can purchase more items than sellers think it can, sellers should demand more 
money than buyers are willing to pay.  
Fourth, the endowment effect examines how much people (personally) value products –
 i.e., consumption goods. In contrast, we have investigated how people judge the (market) value 
of money, an exchange good in that its primary purpose is as a medium of exchange. Scholars 
have theorized that there should be no endowment effect when exchange goods are traded for 
each other (e.g., when one form of currency is traded for another; Kahneman et al. 1990), and 
some research provides support (Novemsky and Kahneman 2005; but see Bateman, Kahneman, 
Munro, Starmer, and Sugden 2005 for more mixed evidence). Our work does not cast doubt on 
this theorizing about exchanging money for money – in fact, in a study (N = 306) not previously 
discussed, we found no evidence that people believed their money could buy more foreign 
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currency than others’ money. Instead, our main studies examined a different question: whether 
people believe that an exchange good (money) can be traded for more consumption goods when 
the money belongs to the self versus others. 
 
Practical Implications and Future Directions 
 
 Our research could explain why people see themselves as spending less money than 
others – a phenomenon called the X effect (Frederick 2010; Kurt and Inman 2013). Because 
people perceive their money to be more valuable than others’, they may not think they need to 
spend as much of it. For example, if people overestimate how much others are willing to spend 
on a box chocolates, they may also underestimate how many boxes of chocolates others can buy 
for a fixed sum of money (as we find). Related to this idea, the amount of money people believe 
they have relative to others may affect how much a fixed amount of their money versus others’ 
money can buy. Beliefs about wealth differences help explain the X effect (Matthews, 
Gheorghiu, and Callan 2016) and may also influence how people judge the market value of their 
own versus others’ money. 
As a first demonstration of our phenomenon, the present studies focused on judgments, 
but future research should examine their behavioral consequences. Everyday decisions about 
money depend in part on people’s judgments of money’s purchasing power. For example, a 
household’s budgeting plans, the amount of money people withdraw from an ATM, the number 
of credit cards they sign up for, and the amount they borrow all depend on how much they think 
money can buy. Our research raises the possibility that people make different decisions about 
money for themselves than the decisions they think others should make. For example, if people 
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assume that their money can purchase more than others’ money, then they might assume they 
need less cash, a lower credit limit, and smaller loans than others do. People may also feel like 
they can retire and live off of a smaller amount of money than can others. As a result, people 
may not appropriately consider relevant base-rate information when making these financial 
decisions. For example, despite knowing that their friends barely scraped by on $100 per day 
during a recent trip to Barcelona, vacationers might budget less for themselves – and be 
unpleasantly surprised to find themselves exceeding their budget. 
 Our results also have implications for decisions about how much money to give to 
others. People may think that the wages they pay, the tips they leave, and the donations they 
make represent greater generosity than identical wages, tips, and donations given by others. As a 
result, they might expect others to give more than they are inclined to give themselves. For 
example, an employer might feel generous for paying $7/hour and see little reason to pay more, 
but judge a different employer as stingy for paying the same wage. In addition to investigating 
this possibility, future research should explore whether decisions about how much money to give 
others depend on how the money is transferred (e.g., Uhlmann and Zhu 2013). A diner who is 
deciding how much of a tip to leave, for example, could think of the money as “currently his” or 
“soon to be the waiter’s.” Based on our results, we would predict that when framed as “currently 
his,” the money will seem particularly valuable and the diner will leave a lower tip – but when 
framed as “soon to be the waiter’s,” the money will seem less valuable and the tip will be larger.  
It will also be interesting to explore the implications of our findings for decisions about 
how much money to save. Research by Hershfield and colleagues (2011) reveals that one 
psychological barrier to saving money is a feeling of discontinuity between the present self and 
the future self. The money one saves for later could be seen as another person’s money (Pronin, 
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Olivola, and Kennedy 2008) – which means that saving money could feel like sacrificing 
purchasing power. On the one hand, this feeling could lead people to spend more now while their 
money can buy more. On the other hand, perhaps this feeling could be leveraged to encourage 
people to save more. That is, if the money seems less valuable to the future self than to the 
current self (even adjusting for inflation), then people should save more to ensure that the future 
self has enough. 
It would also be worthwhile to investigate whether our results extend to other kinds of 
money. Future research might investigate how our findings extend to windfalls of money that 
belong to others or to hard-earned, long-saved money that belongs to others. Research shows that 
people treat their own windfalls differently from their own hard-earned money (Arkes et al. 
1994; Epley and Gneezy 2007; Levav and McGraw 2009), and these differences could be 
moderated by whether people are thinking about others’ windfalls or hard-earned money. The 
same logic might apply to money owned by people who vary on materialism. How people judge 
the value of money that belongs to materialistic people, and likewise how materialistic people 
judge their own and others’ purchasing power might moderate our documented effect: People 
low in materialism might be less concerned about the value of money and thus not exhibit the 
effect (or do so to a lesser extent) compared with people high in materialism. Similarly, people 
may judge the value of other people’s money differently depending on their beliefs about others’ 
materialism.  
Previous work shows that reminders of money can change behavior (Hansen, Kutzner, 
and Wänke 2013; Kouchaki et al. 2013; Piff 2013; Tong, Zheng, and Zhao 2013; Vohs, Mead, 
and Goode 2006, 2008) – for example, by heightening feelings of independence and self-
sufficiency, reducing willingness to help, and diminishing how much people care about social 
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exclusion (Vohs et al. 2006; Zhou, Vohs, and Baumeister 2009). It could be interesting to test 
whether these effects depend on whether the money belongs to the self versus others. Going 
beyond self-other differences, future research could also examine whether people treat money 
differently depending on characteristics of its owner (cf. Newman and Bloom 2014). For 
example, people might treat bills owned by millionaires differently from bills owned by the poor. 
As noted, research could also investigate whether our findings extend to judgments of 
non-monetary resources. For example, perhaps customer loyalty points seem more valuable or a 
car could seem to have a higher trade-in value when owned by the self versus others. More 
tentatively, our results could generalize beyond perceptions of market value to perceptions of 
efficacy. Much like money seems more “effective” in purchasing goods when it belongs to the 
self versus others, medicine could seem more effective in curing one’s own versus others’ 
diseases, or a GPS could seem like a better navigation aid when owned by the self versus others. 
Furthermore, predictions about effectiveness (e.g., medicine’s effectiveness) are more tentative 
because they do not clearly involve perceptions of quantity. Much like psychological distance 
can make quantities of time or geographical distance seem smaller (Maglio et al. 2013a), we 
have shown that psychological distance can make a fixed number of dollars seem like “less 
money.” Psychological distance could conceivably make a pill seem less effective by leading 
people to perceive it as “less medicine,” but this possibility does not follow directly from our 
theorizing. Our theorizing clearly applies when psychological distance could make a fixed 
quantity seem like a smaller amount. It is agnostic about whether psychological distance could 
make non-monetary items seem more effective. Our theory does not claim that the psychological 
distance between oneself and others creates the impression that one’s own possessions are better 
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in every way than others’ are. Instead, it claims that psychological distance makes quantities 
(e.g., $50) seem like a smaller amount (e.g., like less money).   
Although we encourage future research to examine how far our effect extends beyond 
money, we focused our initial theory and research on money because it provides a generalizable, 
high-impact, conservative, and clean test of our theorizing. The test is generalizable because 
people must make judgments about money and its market value frequently in everyday life. 
Money is ubiquitous, and arguably the most important non-social resource. The test is high-
impact because scholarly interest in money spans centuries and disciplines, including marketing, 
economics, psychology, anthropology, and many others (Helms and Maurer 2014). What is 
more, our test is important because compared with other forms of exchange (e.g., flyer points), 
money has more tangible, fungible properties. Likewise, it is a conservative test because 
normatively, the market value of $50 is identical regardless of whether it belongs to the self or 
others. Given people’s extensive experience with money, the fact that they think about their own 
and others’ money differently is surprising. Finally, our test is clean because it minimizes the 
likelihood of confounding factors that differ depending on who owns the money. Examining 
non-monetary resources could introduce confounds unrelated to psychological distance. For 
example, people could think their car has a higher trade-in value than others’ cars because they 
think they drive their car less frequently or more gently than others. But unlike cars, when it 
comes to money, it is not possible to get “more from it” than someone else’s money. Thus, in our 
research we tested both a wide-reaching and conservative exemplar of our theorizing.  
Finally, our research has important implications for the decisions people make about 
others’ money. Financiers make such decisions so frequently that they refer to other people’s 
money in shorthand, using the acronym OPM. Previous work has shown that people make riskier 
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investments with others’ money than with their own (e.g., Trump, Finkelstein, and Connell 
2014). Although this phenomenon likely has multiple causes, our results suggest a novel 
explanation: People may think that it is less problematic to lose others’ money because it has less 
market value than their own. Given popular press (e.g., Krugman 2001) and best-selling 
management books (e.g., Bagli 2013) heralding how easy it is to invest other people’s money, 
this will be an important topic for future research. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of money is to facilitate economic transactions by quantifying value. Money 
only has value because it can be exchanged for goods and services. Our research investigated 
how people perceive the value of money itself, and revealed that they think a fixed amount of 
their money can buy more products and be more helpful to organizations than the same amount 
of others’ money. In other words, the perceived market value of money itself depends on who 
owns it. In this way, our research documents a novel way in which the value of money is in the 
eye of the beholder. 
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TABLE 1 
 
UNSTANDARDIZED SCORES FOR NUMBER OF ITEMS THAT CAN BE 
PURCHASED WITH A FIXED SUM OF MONEY ($50 FOR STUDIES 1A-B, 3-5, AND 8; 
$100 FOR STUDY 6) 
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TABLE 1 (CONT.) 
 
UNSTANDARDIZED SCORES FOR NUMBER OF ITEMS THAT CAN BE 
PURCHASED WITH A FIXED SUM OF MONEY ($50 FOR STUDIES 1A-B, 3-5, AND 8; 
$100 FOR STUDY 6) 
 
 
Notes  
a 
p values represent results to t tests between self- and other-owned money conditions (p values 
from negative tests are in parentheses). 
b 
In study 3, values represent results to t tests between self- and other-owned money in the near-
hypothetical-distance condition.
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FIGURE 1 
 
THE LOGARITHMIC RELATION BETWEEN PERCEIVED PURCHASING POWER 
AND SOCIAL DISTANCE 
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